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ABSTRACT

EFFECTIVENESS OF DIFFERENT REGIME TYPES IN PRESERVING COMMON
RESOURCES: EVIDENCE FROM A LAB EXPERIMENT

David Bates
Political Science Department
Bachelor of Arts, Political Science

This experiment is based on a game-theoretic problem that has troubled the field of
political economy since people first started grazing cows in pastures: how can economies best
solve collective action problems? This experiment looks at one aspect of this question—types of
governance. Are different styles of government (democracies, dictatorships, etc) more or less
likely to prevent a common-pool resource (as these goods are called by Elinor Ostrom) from
being depleted? Or is the style of governance irrelevant to the question of whether a CPR
(common-pool resource) is sustained?
The problem of CPRs (common pool resources) is much the same as this game. If
everyone cooperates with the plan (that is, takes only their fair share), then the collective payout
would be far greater than if any one person had defected from the plan. For example, everyone
can graze on the pasture for a long time if no one consumes faster than the pasture can grow
back. However, if one person defects from the plan, then that person can walk away with all of
the CPR, leaving nothing for the other players unless the other players also defect.
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I will experiment using a democratic society, dictatorship, and a control group with no
leadership. I will then take note of which groups were able to preserve the common pool
resource until the end of the game. I hypothesize that the control group will be the most effective
at preserving the common pool resource.
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Introduction:
This theoretical analysis and experimental design explore a game theoretic
problem that has captivated political economy scholars since people first started grazing
cows in pastures: how can economies best solve collective action problems? This
experiment looks at one aspect of this question—types of governance. Are different
regime types (democracies, autocracies, etc.) more or less likely to prevent a commonpool resource (CPR) from being depleted? Or is the regime type irrelevant to the question
of whether a CPR is sustained?
Literature Review:
Much work has been done on the question of how to share what Elinor Ostrom
referred to as “common pool resources”. Ostrom’s work brought a rational, game
theoretic method to the problem, and her work has been followed by that of hundreds of
scholars.
Ostrom’s work, outlined in her book, Governing the Commons (1990), focused on
how differently structured institutions made it more or less likely for a group of people to
cooperate in preserving a CPR such as a fishing lake or forest. Ostrom focused on small
communities, analyzing a wide variety of institutions. She also discussed the costs and
benefits of private ownership versus state control of the resource as conservation
methods. Ostrom suggested that neither method was a permanent solution to the problem.
In addition, Ostrom, along with others (Anderies, Cardenas, Ensminger, etc.)
participated in laboratory and field experiments about common-pool resource problems.
Ostrom focused on the ways that different institutional structures affected the outcome of
a CPR scenario. In her experiments she found evidence that participants will engage in
self-governance, even in the absence of institutional pressure. In another experiment,
Ostrom showed the importance of communication in the success of a CPR scenario.
However, in a criticism of current experimental methods, Anderies referred to models
like Ostrom’s as “stick figures” that needed to be “fleshed out”. He called for
experiments that studied institutional arrangements using dynamic models that account
for characteristics of the participants and microsituational variables. In my experiment,
characteristics of the participants are accounted for by random selection, but a further
exploration of characteristics and microsituational variables in the full experiment may
yield interesting results.
In addition to laboratory experiments, there is a strong trend in the literature
towards field experiments, where game theoretic models are tested with truly
representative subjects in an existing marketplace. These experiments have been done in
Colombia, Tanzania, and many other developing countries (Cardenas, 2000; Castillo,
2005). The results from these experiments are mixed, some supporting prevailing theory
and lab experiments, and others refuting it. All this suggests that there are many unseen
variables at play in these scenarios. As such, a lab experiment can be useful for isolating
the effect of one specific variable, trading a bit of external validity for clear causal links.
The area of the literature which concerns this paper most directly deals
with the effect of institutions on the CPR problem. As mentioned above, Ostrom’s
extensive work on this subject goes against the economic theory promoting
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private or state ownership, claiming that self-governance will exist among people
with no higher authority. Rodriguez-Sickert, et al. showed the effectiveness of
low fines in policing people’s behaviors, and how the absence of these fines led to
an increase and then decrease in cooperation. And in a case study in Nepal,
Iversen, et al. found that institutional weakness was to blame for elite capture of
goods and maldistribution of common resources in the area of Terai. These
experiments and studies lead right into my work, which takes the question of
institutions and focuses it on comparative political regimes.
One aspect of the CPR problem that was not sufficiently addressed by Ostrom or
other scholars was the issue of large-scale political institutions. While specific village- or
city-level institutions were analyzed as case studies, the question of how regime type
(democratic versus autocratic) could affect a CPR scenario received only a passing
mention. In this paper, I would like to address the question more in depth.
The current literature on this topic has said a great deal about certain institutions
that have preserved common-pool resources and others that have not. The problem is that
often these solutions are tailored to a specific region or political environment. This makes
it very difficult to transfer the discovered solutions to resources in other places. This
project instead looks at very general political institutions, with the goal of understanding
which of these institutions, when applied generally, is most likely to lead to conservation
of a common-pool resource.
I will first review the theoretical background of the CPR problem. Then, I will
address how two different regime types (representative democracy and autocracy) can
affect the outcome of a CPR scenario when compared to a community with no central
authority, like the kind Ostrom writes about (hereafter referred to as “direct democracy”
or “control”). Finally, I will put forth my design and the results of an experiment which
tests the effect of different regime types on the CPR problem. A key piece of literature
which outlines experimental designs for testing people’s behavior in CPR games is Rules,
Games, & Common-Pool Resources by Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner, and James Walker.
In this book, the ideas from Governing the Commons are tested in the lab as well as
studied in the field. This book helped to give me a viable experimental framework for
testing subjects’ behavior in CPR games. I used Ostrom’s laboratory framework to set up
the environment for my experiment, and then replaced Ostrom’s experiment with my
own design to capture the independent variable of regime type.
Theory:
The problem of how to ensure that people cooperate to conserve a publicly
accessible resource is as old as civilization. It is summed up nicely in a classical game
theoretic model named “The Prisoner’s Dilemma”. In this game, two criminals are put in
separate rooms and given the option of informing on their partner or staying quiet. If both
give information to the police, then both go to prison for 10 years. If only one gives up
information while the other stays quiet, the one who confessed gets off without any jail
time, while his partner must serve 15 years. If both criminals stay quiet, then they both
receive a 2-year sentence. The payoff structure is shown below, with the numbers
reflecting years served, so that higher numbers are less desirable.
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The problem of CPRs is a specialized case of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. If everyone
cooperates (that is, takes only their fair share), then the collective payout will be far
greater than if any one person had defected (taken more than their fair share). For
example, if everyone grazes their share, then the pasture can regrow and will be a
sustainable resource for generations. However, if one person defects, then that person can
deplete the pasture faster than the pasture can recover, leaving nothing for the other
players. In this case, the only way for any player to maximize their access to the resource
is to also defect, taking as much of the resource as possible for themselves before it is
completely destroyed. Thus, in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, everyone has an incentive to
defect.
Remember that in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the criminals are kept in separate
rooms. One does not know what the other is doing, and so must infer it based on the
criminal’s knowledge of the payoff structure. In the classical payoff structure described
above, the rational position is to expect your partner to defect. Thus, in order to avoid the
15-year sentence, you will also defect, and you will both serve 10 years. The only
equilibrium solution to the game is for both players to defect, even though this results in a
payoff that is not optimal for either. Each would have preferred to get the 2-year
sentence, but, because of rational expectations and incentives, each receives the 10-year
sentence.
In a CPR scenario, no one person knows what the others intend to do with the
CPR. If everyone cooperates, then everyone can enjoy the resource for a long time.
However, there is an incentive to cheat—graze more than your share, fish more than your
share, or harvest more than your share—because if you are the only one that cheats, you
can have nearly all of the resource to yourself. The CPR problem is that everyone in the
community understands this, so everyone would rationally choose to cheat so that they
can at least get a piece of the resource before it is gone.
This is the problem that economists and political scientists have been trying to
solve. How can you change the incentives so that it is in the best interest of the people to
cooperate with each other and the preserve the CPR? Many economic and political
institutions have tried to solve this problem, with varying levels of success. I will now
examine how differences in regime types can lead to differences in how well a CPR is
preserved. Following, I will examine how two lenses of comparative politics – behavioral
and cultural theories, respectively – alter the predictions of this model.
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Representative Democracy:
Democratically elected representatives are given power by a popular vote of the
people. In most political systems, the representatives keep this power by securing
reelection by another popular vote. The assumption of this system is that facing reelection
will drive a leader to provide public goods and engage in other activities that are
beneficial for the population. Within Bueno de Mesquita et al.’s framework, an
incumbent representative can be challenged by a candidate who can provide more public
goods for the “selectorate”, or winning coalition needed to stay in power. This challenge
drives the incumbent to provide enough public goods to maintain that winning coalition
for him or herself (Mesquita et al. 2005).
Then, according to selectorate theory, we would see that the CPR would be
preserved by the incumbent representative in order to keep providing public goods to the
selectorate. The incumbent would do what was necessary to ensure that the CPR survived
for as long as he or she was running for reelection. We can thus assume that, in theory,
the CPR would survive under a representative democracy. However, there are alternative
scenarios to consider. One such scenario is when a candidate runs up against term limits,
and thus cannot be reelected. This may cause both decreased incentive for the current
leader to preserve the CPR, and, as the people suspect the leader of skimming, a
devaluation of the people’s future payoffs. This would raise the people’s incentive to take
more than their individual shares and deplete the CPR.
How would this system play out in a small, rural community, like the kind that
often faces CPR problems? If this community had a democratically elected mayor and a
pasture for grazing that needed to be managed, the most efficient way for someone to
secure election would be to present themselves as the best possible manager of the public
good. If this person later failed to provide this public good by failing to preserve the CPR,
then that person would face the prospect of not being reelected.
Autocracy:
In an autocratic government, one person rules by fiat. The leader is not beholden
to public opinion or a rule of law that governs his or her decisions. Rather, the leader
maintains power by maintaining the loyalty of the citizenry to the point that citizens do
not revolt and oust him or her from office.
Autocracies are propped up by economic or security payouts to the population, as
well as military force. The money for these payouts, as well as the money to fund the
strong military presence, will often come from a CPR (oil, diamonds, etc.). The leader
who pays off the people by sharing from the CPR stays in power, and so gets to continue
his or her own theft of the CPR. If the leader can, in addition, maintain a coalition that
will help prevent access to the CPR except that authorized by the ruler, then the ruler’s
exploitation can continue without interference from others.
In this case, we would have a private ownership scenario, with the dictator being
the de facto private owner of the CPR. This is one way that economic theory allows for
the solution of a CPR problem (Ostrom, 1990). Since the dictator is the private owner, he
or she has a vested interest in preserving the CPR for the future. As long as this private

4

ownership is maintained by the ruler’s absolute power, the CPR will also be maintained.
It is in this way that an autocracy can preserve a CPR.
Direct Democracy:
The case of a direct democracy may at first appear trivial. After all, it is simply a
gathering of people with no central governing body trying to administrate a CPR by
majority rule. It is more the absence of a regime than a regime itself, which is why I use it
as the control group for my experiment. However, this political structure highlights a
very important aspect of the CPR problem – repeated interactions.
Recalling the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, note that a key aspect of the game is that
the two players do not intend on ever playing the game with each other again, that is, the
game only lasts for one round. The CPR problem, however, is an infinite-horizon game,
with the number of rounds equal to some unknown value between one and infinity. If the
players of the game are not criminals, but members of the same village or community,
then these players must choose their actions by taking into account their next n rounds of
play with the same players, where n is an unknown value, expected to be long term. In
this scenario, a decision to defect from the status quo leads to a punishment in the next
round or rounds, while cooperating leads to continued availability of the CPR. As long as
the future benefits of cooperation are given more weight than the one-time immediate
payout for defecting, then everyone would have an incentive to cooperate. The equation
for this equilibrium looks like this:
𝜋 𝑑 − 𝜋 ∗ < (𝜋 ∗ − 𝜋 𝑁 )(

𝛿
)
1+𝛿

where 𝜋 𝑑 refers to the payoff to the person from defection, 𝜋 ∗ refers to the payoff to the
person from cooperating to preserve the resource, 𝜋 𝑁 refers to the payoff to the player in
the strict Nash equilibrium that serves as the punishment path after the player’s defection,
and 𝛿 refers to the discount factor, or how much value a player gives to payoffs in the
future compared to current payoffs. 𝛿 must be a number between 0 and 1. In order for a
player to be incentivized to choose the future payoffs of cooperation over the current
payoff of defection, the 𝛿 must be high, which is interpreted as the player valuing future
payoffs as almost equal to current payoffs. The other ways to make the above equation
true are for the defecting payoff to be low, or for the difference in payoffs between
cooperation and the punishment path to be high. By this equation, we can see how in
direct democracy it is possible for a CPR to be preserved because of the repeated
interactions that the players have with each other.
How do the lenses of cultural and behavioral theories change these simple
models? Let us examine each in turn.
Culturalism:
The theory of culturalism is that political actors will change their preferences to
better match the culture in which they live, even if the behavior encouraged by the culture
is irrational. A cultural perspective often explains gender or race discrimination, blind
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deference to a deified authority figure, or adherence to various religious tenets. By
proposing deviation from strictly rational behavior, the cultural perspective changes the
predicted outcome for a CPR situation under each of the three types of government I have
mentioned.
Culturalism and Representative Democracy:
Under rational choice theory, the citizens will behave in the interest of the public
good and choose those leaders who would best preserve the CPR, so that the citizens can
reap the benefits of the CPR. The election of these leaders is what results in the best
payout in the long run. However, culturalism has a different perspective about how
elections will play out.
Under culturalism, the deciding factor of a person’s vote is not necessarily what
individually benefits him or her the most (rational choice), but what vote was the most
socially acceptable. This culture, in the form of so-called “popular opinion”, that builds
up around specific candidates will motivate voters to judge candidates on standards not
necessarily related to how well the candidate would preserve the CPR. For example, it’s
possible a community’s culture places a high value on having men in office. Then, the
community will be more likely to put a man in office, even if the candidate who is most
likely to preserve the CPR is a woman. It is also possible that a community’s culture
values fiscal independence over high government spending. Then, the community is
likely to elect a candidate who will preserve the CPR.
The cultural values, which are products of social norms and values, have no
assurance of lining up with rational choice values. Thus, the possibility of a democratic
government preserving a common pool resource depends greatly on what qualities the
culture values. If the culture values qualities in a candidate that will make them likely to
preserve the CPR, then the CPR will most likely be preserved. If, however, the culture
values qualities not at all correlated with preservation of the CPR, then it is highly
unlikely that the CPR will be preserved, as the leaders elected would not make choices
which best preserve the CPR. In this model, what a society values is directly connected to
their future prosperity.
Culturalism and Autocracy:
In the autocratic model under rational choice, the fiat leader has a type of private
ownership over the CPR. No one takes from the CPR without the leader’s permission,
and no one takes more than the leader allows. Under rational choice, this is a successful
system, since it is in the leader’s best interest to preserve the CPR so that he or she can
continue to take from it. How would a cultural perspective change this situation?
In a rational choice model, the leader has incentive to know exactly how much
CPR he or she can distribute and to whom. The leader knows how much he or she can
give out, and only gives out that amount. However, a cultural perspective suggests that
cultural pressures, if not from the people then perhaps among other leaders, can cause the
leader to behave irrationally. If, for example, there is a cultural celebration and the leader
is pressured to give out more CPR than dictated by the model, this cultural influence can
distort the CPR, causing the leader to use more now and take more from the people later.

6

On the other side, if a cultural holiday includes some type of fasting, it could pressure the
leader to let the CPR lay fallow. Although neither of these would necessarily lead to the
depletion of the CPR, neither would be considered optimal behavior.
Cultural pressures, then, can cause a leader to act irrationally in his or her
distribution of the CPR. Cultural pressures may cause the leader to deplete the CPR to
satisfy cultural norms. Thus, the cultural perspective breaks the certainty of a rational
choice perspective that an autocrat/private owner would perfectly preserve the CPR.
Culturalism and Direct Democracy:
Finally, we look at the direct democracy model from a cultural perspective. From
a rational choice perspective, repeated interactions give every player an incentive to
cooperate, since they will get a better payout this way than if they defect and are
punished by the group. This way, everybody cooperates, and the CPR is preserved.
It is possible that the cultural perspective would arrive at the same conclusion in
the direct democracy model. Where the rational choice perspective says people obey the
rules because it is in their best interest, the cultural perspective would say that people are
reacting to cultural norms. Since everyone in the society is equally benefitted or harmed
by the preservation of the CPR, it follows that the culture will favor an even, rational
approach to the CPR.
Of course, this may not be the case. It is also possible that cultural norms of the
society favor an uneven distribution of the CPR, even to the point of depleting the
resource. This may be in order to give more of the resource to the poor, the sick, mothers,
children, or even to sacrifice a part of the CPR in some kind of religious ceremony. In
short, it is impossible to know how the cultural perspective would affect a direct
democracy model.
Behavioralism:
We will now look at how a behavioral perspective changes the results of the three
models listed here. The behavioral perspective, in a sense, is the opposite of the rational
choice perspective. While rational choice says that human beings are rational, calculating
creatures, the behavioral perspective allows for behavior that cannot be rationally
explained. I will now examine how a behavioral perspective affects the outcomes I
predict from the three models of government.
Behavioralism and Representative Democracy:
As with all three perspectives, I focus on the voting behavior of the players as the
main variable controlling the outcome. Under rational choice, the voters’ behavior is
based purely on which candidate is most likely to preserve the CPR. In the cultural
perspective, voters’ choice may be determined by other cultural values that cause the
voters to not elect the candidate that is most likely to preserve the CPR. From a
behavioral perspective, there are two possible outcomes to the election.
First, we look at voters on an individual level. Each one has a rational choice of
candidate. However, the behavioral perspective says that an individual voter can choose
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to vote irrationally. This can happen for many different reasons—the voter could be
experiencing loss aversion which causes him or her to miscalculate incentives, or
confirmation bias, making him or her overconfident in the decision to vote for a
particular candidate. There are many different ways that behavioral tendencies manifest
themselves.
What is important is that if this irrationality is present on an individual rather than
a collective level, than it will be accounted for by the law of averages. In this way, a few
people acting irrationally will not be enough to wash out the other rationally behaving
voters. Therefore, the rational, optimal candidate is still elected, and the CPR is
preserved.
Of course, it is very unlikely that the population does not experience collective
irrationality. When a candidate is able to sway the public using irrational arguments that
target human behavioral tendencies, then he or she may be able to steal the election, even
if he or she is not the candidate most likely to preserve the CPR. In this situation, the
behavioral perspective leads to a very different outcome than the rational choice
perspective.
Behavioralism and Autocracy:
How would a behavioral perspective change the outlook of the autocratic model?
We know that in the rational choice model the autocrat preserves the CPR because he or
she is the sole proprietor, and is therefore not concerned with anyone else depleting the
resource. In the cultural model, depending on the cultural norms, the autocrat may or may
not preserve the CPR, as living up to existing cultural norms is more important than
behaving rationally.
In the behavioral perspective, we look at the individual or group level
irrationalities that may affect decisions. One case of this would be a mass irrationality of
the other players. This could take the form of a mob mentality that causes them to think
that the autocrat has been stealing from them and does not deserve the CPR. In response,
they make the irrational move to storm the CPR and try to take it back, in the process
destroying it. This is one fairly negative example of a behavioral perspective prediction
of the autocratic model.
Another possibility is that the autocrat behaves irrationally. This irrationality
could come in the form of short-sightedness, causing the autocrat to deplete the CPR too
quickly. An extreme form of this short-sightedness is that the autocrat greatly discounts
his future earnings from the CPR, making it more attractive to him or her to take all of
the CPR now. Either of these irrational strategies would result in the depletion of the
CPR, when a rational, optimal strategy could have preserved it. As with the democratic
model, in the autocratic model, a behavioral perspective is much more pessimistic about
the preservation of the CPR.
Behavioralism and Direct Democracy:
The behavioral perspective states that the various players in the direct democracy
model can behave irrationally. This means that they can either decide to take too little or
too much from the CPR. They may decide to take too little because they miscalculate the
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replenishment rate, or maybe because they miscalculate the cost of harvesting the
resource compared to the benefit of an extra unit of the resource. On the other hand, they
may decide to take too much because they overvalue the current payoff and undervalue
the future punishment. Even if the structure is set up to perfectly allow for rational
behavior, the behavioral perspective states that human beings can often miscalculate
incentives to arrive at an irrational conclusion.
Which side will the player(s) err on? Will they tend towards taking less than the
optimal amount? Or will they act on poor calculations of punishment-reward and take too
much? Will these effects even out when spread across the population? These are the
questions that make it difficult to ascertain what effect human behavioral tendencies will
have on the direct democracy game. While the CPR could be preserved, it is also possible
that suboptimal behavior by some players could deplete it.
Experiment:
While the distinct theories of behavioralism and culturalism are ambiguous in
their application to the problem of CPRs, an experiment which randomly assigns regime
type to a certain population may give a surer result. Absent the ability to randomly assign
regime types on a large scale, a laboratory experiment is opted for, leading to a less
nuanced but more controlled environment. I recognize that this discussion can and should
have a sequel in which natural experiments are found and examined. These natural
experiments are an avenue for further research that can either corroborate or refute the
findings of this laboratory experiment.
Method:
This experimental design is in large part borrowed from Ostrom, Gardner and
Walker in their book Rules, Games and Common-Pool Resources. While the treatments
used in this experiment are different from theirs, the general setup is the same.
I randomly selected groups of five participants from a pool of volunteers. I then
put the groups into separate rooms, and each group was assigned to one of two treatments
or to be a control group. The two treatments were a representative democratic system and
an autocratic system (discussed more at length later in this paper).
Each player was told that they were starting out with $5. In addition, a pool of
money containing $16 was available to the group. The participants were told that the
researcher would come in at regular intervals to ask how much money was to be taken
out of the pool and given to the participants that round. It was explained clearly to the
participants that they would walk away with whatever money they requested out of the
pool. If the participants asked for more than was in the pool, the remaining money would
be given proportionally according to their requests.
In order to remove the incentive to take more money just prior to the last round,
the number of rounds was also randomized, and the participants were not told how long
the game would last. This preventative measure had limited effectiveness – more details
on this, as well as proposals for more effective preventative measures to be used in the
full experiment, will be discussed towards the end of the paper.
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The participants were also informed that the pool of money would replenish based
on how much money was left in the pool. For this experiment caps were set at $16, $11,
$7, $4, and $2. Once the money supply dropped below a cap, it would only replenish up
to that cap for the next round. If the pool dropped below $2, it would stop replenishing
altogether. In this way, players faced tighter and tighter restrictions as they decided to
take greater amounts of money from the pool. These rules were made clear to the
participants, and the numbers for the different caps were written on a whiteboard plainly
visible throughout the game. Finally, the participants were told the rules of their
particular treatment. Participants were allowed to ask clarifying questions, but they were
never told the duration of their game or the fact that other groups were playing under
different rules. This discussion prior to the experiment is a way to control for the variable
of information, which is important in game-theory, but was not the variable of interest in
this particular experiment. I will now describe the conditions of the control and the two
treatments.
Control Group:
Each round, each player was asked out to fill out a sheet of paper indicating how
much money they would like to take out of the pool for themselves. By default, this
amount was kept private between the player and the researcher, but there was no rule
preventing the players from sharing their amounts with each other, and there was no
penalty for a player that is able to see another player’s amount without the other player’s
knowledge. In this way, commitment devices and strategy were both permitted as means
for players to reach a more profitable outcome.
After delivering the initial rule summary and answering questions, the researcher
left the room without asking the participants for a request for money. In each round that
followed, when the researcher entered, he passed out the sheets of paper, and then
collected them. He then tallied the amounts and informed the group how much money
was collectively removed from the pool (not how much was taken by each individual). If
the pool was at a level where it could replenish, the researcher “replenished” the pool to
the appropriate amount based on the aforementioned rules. This final amount was written
on a whiteboard, and the players were told that they had that much money to withdraw
from in the next round. Finally, the researcher either told the group that the game was
over, or that he would be back next round.
In each of the groups, roughly ten minutes passed between each round. Neither
the treatments nor the control had any rules about what could and could not be done
during these rounds, except that the participants were not allowed to interact in any way
with the other groups that were playing at the same time in other classrooms. What
happened during this break was meant to simulate the society that develops in a village or
community surrounding a common pool resource, and so it was left as unstructured as
possible.
In the control group, there were no leaders, no elections, and no formal sanctions
established. There was no rule against the group coming up with their own rules, but the
experiment proceeded in the same way regardless – each person was given the
opportunity each round to withdraw from the pool, and that money was theirs to walk
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away with. As this amount was a nontrivial sum, there was incentive for the players to
maximize their winnings.
Treatment 1 (Democracy):
In this group, players were told the same rules as the control group, with one key
difference. The participants would not be able to decide for themselves how much money
would be given to them from the pool. Rather, the group elected a leader from among its
five members, and this leader had exclusive power over the amounts of money given to
each participant. The leader stayed in power for two consecutive rounds, after which
another election was held. No term limits were imposed, so it was possible for the same
person to be elected leader every two rounds for the duration of the game. If a new leader
was elected, that leader had the power starting that same round to give money to players
(as well as to themselves). There were no restrictions given on campaigning or votebuying, neither were the participants encouraged or discouraged to participate in any such
activities. All of these rules were explained to the participants at the beginning of the
game.
As with the control group, the participants were given about ten minutes between
the initial instructions and the first request for money, in this case preceded by an
election. The election was done by secret ballot (unless the group had decided to vote
using a more transparent method). The votes were collected by the researcher, tallied, and
the group was told who won the election along with the number of votes for and against
that person.
The leader was then given a sheet where he or she wrote down the amount to be
given to each player and to him or herself. These amounts could be different for each
player and for the leader, enabling the leader to dole out specific punishments or rewards
as he or she saw fit. The researcher received the sheet, and then privately informed each
participant of the amount he or she had received via a secret note (again, there were no
rules against the leader or players sharing their amounts if they wished to). Finally, the
researcher told the group how much money had been taken from the pool, how much was
left in the pool after it replenished, whether there would be another round, and whether or
not there would be an election in the next round.
Treatment 2 (Autocracy):
The rules of this group were different from those of the democratic treatment in
that the leader who decided the payments was not elected. Rather, each participant was
asked at the beginning how much of their initial $5 they were willing to pay to be made
the dictator. The participants were told that this dictator would remain in power for the
duration of the game unless the other participants paid a total of $10 to replace him or her
with another participant. The money paid to become dictator and the money paid to
remove one would all be taken from the participants’ final totals.
After these rules were explained, the researcher left the room. When he returned,
he first took everyone’s bid for becoming the dictator. He then announced the winning
bid and gave the winner a sheet where the leader wrote down his or her payment, as well
as the payment to everyone else for that round. There were no ties in bids during this
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experiment, but if there had been, they would have been broken by a second bid only
between those two participants. If no one had bid, then everyone would be asked to bid
again until a leader was chosen.
In every round following, each person besides the leader was asked to write
down, privately (unless the group had decided otherwise), how much he or she was
willing to pay to replace the current dictator with another player. If the total was equal to
or greater than $10, the leader would be removed and replaced by the desired (majority
vote) leader of those who contributed to the “coup”. The researcher announced only
whether or not the amount to replace the leader was reached, and then announced the
payment totals and pool amounts as described in the other treatments.
Hypothesis:
I hypothesize that the democratic treatment will be the most effective at evenly
distributing the resource and in preserving it. This will be measured by the variance in the
total amounts received by participants. I expect that variance in the democratic treatment
will be smaller than in the autocratic or control conditions. I also expect that the
democratic treatment will have the greatest percentage of groups that do not deplete the
common pool resource.
Rejection Region:
The significance level at which I will reject the null hypothesis that a governance
treatment does not affect the preservation of common pool resources is P=.05, or 5%.
Results:
In analyzing this data, I focused on how the group did collectively as well as the
participants individually. I ran several regressions where the variable concerned was
regressed on dummy variables for the democratic and autocratic treatment. To avoid
multicollinearity, the control treatment was defined as a 0 value for both the democratic
and autocratic dummy variables.
First, the individual analysis. This analysis is important because it shows how
individuals are directly affected by different regime types. It also shows us the
distribution of money within the group between regime types. In this way, we can see
whether money is more or less centralized in different regime types, and whether this
money is centralized in the leader, in his or her supporters, or in non-supporters. Broadly,
this part of the analysis looks at the microeconomic side of the impact of regime types on
common pool resources.
As we can see in the table, the average total per participant was significantly less
in the autocratic treatment. This finding was significant at the .10, but not quite at the .05
level, so I am unable to reject the null hypothesis. However, the variance in amount paid
was not significantly different from the control in either the autocratic or democratic
treatment, indicating that the distribution of the resource was similar in each treatment.
As another proxy for distribution, I ran regressions on the highest amount paid to
a participant in each group against the dummy values for the regime types. I ran a similar
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regression on the lowest amount paid to a participant in each group. Neither of these
yielded significant results, reinforcing the notion that resource distribution was not
affected by regime type.

Autocracy

(1)
Average Total Per
Participant
0.174
(0.125)

(2)
Variance in Total
Per Participant
1.023
(17.79)

(3)
Highest Total

(4)
Lowest Total

0.205
(0.677)

0.400
(0.656)

0.861
(0.621)
9

1.97978e+09
(3.44261e+10)
9

64.50
(212.7)
9

0.513
(0.842)
9

Democracy
N

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Arguably the most important difference between the control and the treatments
was the presence of a leader, elected or bought. I ran several regressions to analyze how
the player that held the leadership position played differently or received a different
payout.
In the first model, I regress the amount paid to every player in every round on
dummy variables for whether that person was the dictator or the president in that round.
The base group is not holding any of these positions, signified by a 0 for both of the
dummy variables. In the second model, I regress the total paid to each player at the end of
the game on dummy variables signifying whether that player was ever appointed
president or dictator during the game (i.e. there could be two presidents in the same group
because one was elected after the other). In the third model, I regress the total paid to
each player on the number of rounds that that player served as dictator or president. In
model 2, we are measuring whether simply being appointed to a leadership role affected
the total paid to that player. In model 3, we are measuring whether the effect is correlated
with the number of rounds that a player remains in power.

Dictator for
Round

(1)
Amount Paid Per
Round
2.031**

(2)
Total Paid to Player

(0.526)
President for
Round

0.732
(0.226)

President
(Yes/No)

4.581
(4.007)

Dictator

0.610

13

(3)
tot

(Yes/No)
(0.889)
1.870

President
(Number of
Rounds)

(0.732)
Dictator (Number
of Rounds)

N

0.914
285

45

(0.250)
45

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

The results from these models seem contradictory. In model 1, we find our only
result which is significant at the .01 level. At this level, dictators were paid more than
those who held no office, with a coefficient of .708. However, in model 2, presidents are
paid more at a .10 significance level with a coefficient of 1.52, and in model 3, presidents
are paid more at a level that is almost significant at the .10 level, with a coefficient of
.626. What could account for this disparity?
One reason may be that there is an outlier in the president treatment, where one
participant left with $26, which was far larger than any other participant (the next largest
being $15). This amount might have been enough to account for the results in models 2
and 3. However, the one-time largest withdrawal of $16 was not as removed from the
trend of withdrawals, preventing it from skewing the data taken at the player-round level.
The notion that being a dictator may result in higher pay is an interesting one that
deserves further investigation. It is possible that this discrepancy comes from the fact that
the dictator requests more money in order to recoup his or her cost to become leader.
However, given the small amounts generally paid for leadership, I believe that this does
not account for the whole difference.
Next, we look at the aggregate data and indicators for each group. This constitutes
the macroeconomic analysis of the difference between regime types when dealing with a
CPR. These data include the number of rounds the group played before the resource was
depleted (if the group ended before they were told to end by the researcher), the total
money paid out to the group, and how much the group depleted the resource, as measured
by the cap level that the group ended on.
To determine whether the regime type affected how quickly the resource was
depleted, I ran a regression of rounds played on the treatment dummy variables. Since the
number of rounds was randomized, when the game ended depended in large part on how
well the group preserved the resource, or was a reflection of how the group discounted
the future winnings they could get by continuing to play compared to the amount they
would leave on the table by not cashing out before the game was ended (the limitations
inherent in this game design, and suggestions to remedy it in the full-scale experiment,
are discussed in the limitations section of this article). The results of this regression are
insignificant, so we cannot infer a connection between regime type and number of rounds
played.
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As another measurement of the length of time played, I regress the number of
rounds played expressed as a percentage of the number of rounds that that group was
assigned on the dummy variables. The advantage of this method of measurement is that it
captures those groups whose time ended when the researcher announced it, as compared
to those who ended the game early by depleting the resource. Using this measurement
also gives insignificant results, supporting the previous finding.

(1)
Rounds Played
Autocracy

0.264
(0.296)

(2)
Rounds as a
Percentage
0.862
(0.131)

Democracy

1.396
(1.566)
9

1.104
(0.169)
9

N

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

*

In order to establish the depletion of the resource, I ran a regression of the cap
level that each group reached on the dummy treatment variables. This regression was
meaningless, as every group besides one completely depleted this resource. I believe that
this is a flaw in the game design where the game did not effectively simulate an infinite
horizon game. Later in this paper I will suggest solutions to this for the full-scale
experiment.
(1)
Level
1.000
(0.544)

Autocracy

Democracy

1.948
(1.060)
9

N

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

I was also planning on running a logit regression to see if the regime type affected
the probability of a group finishing the game, meaning that they played until the
researcher told them to stop. This might yield insights into the discounting of future
winnings and the political and economic stability of one regime type over the other, or
over the control. However, the sample size prevented me from running this regression,
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since the only group that finished the game was a control group. This regression might
yield interesting results in the full-scale experiment.
As is, this data would suggest that regime type has little to no effect on the
macroeconomic outcomes of a common pool resource problem. The community will
receive a similar payout, and the resource will last a similar length of time, whether the
community has a democratically elected leader, a dictator, or no leader at all. The impact
on microeconomic indicators is also small, except in the case of the dictator, who seems
to get more money for him or herself than other players. The president may have a
similar outcome, but a strong outlier makes it difficult to conclude. In summation, it
would seem based on this data that regime type has virtually no impact on how a CPR
problem is handled. Of course, this is only a pilot study, and it suffers from great
limitations, suggesting that we see these results as merely signposts of where to go in the
full experiment.
Limitations:
First, it must be kept in mind that this is a lab experiment and not a field
experiment. Therefore, there are some inherent problems with external validity. For
example, even though there are several rounds played, playing this game over only two
hours or so is not truly reflective of real-world CPR scenarios.
I also understand that my governance models are, of necessity, very simplistic.
These simpler models were adopted so that effects could be seen more clearly, and also
so that the test could have the power that comes with a greater number of games. The
power of the experiment would have been lesser had the models required more
complicated rules that necessitated a greater number of participants.
Perhaps most importantly, the statistical power of this experiment is constrained
by the small number of observations (9) that I was able to make at the group level. While
in some of the player-round observations we had an n- of more than 200, conclusions
about the group or player-group units are without statistical power. With more funding,
more games could be run, yielding more powerful results.
As this is a pilot experiment, in addition to increasing the scale I hope to improve
the experimental design in the full experiment to address problems found in this study.
The most glaring of these is the issue of timing. In an attempt to recruit volunteers, I
provided an estimate of how long the experiment would last. In doing so, I inadvertently
affected their perception of the game, and disincentivized them from playing as if the
game had an infinite horizon. To address this problem, I will either not give a timeframe,
or will give a much wider range of possible durations. Also, to further incentivize
participants to play the game as if it had an infinite horizon, I will attach a penalty for
every round that the group does not play because they depleted the resource. I hope that
these adjustments can properly align players incentives to more closely simulate the
infinite horizon of a real-world CPR game.
Policy Implications:
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What are the policy implications of this research? While these current findings are
not conclusive, it is important to consider what changes governments could make to their
care for CPRs based on the findings of this and future experiments.
If results show that some form of governance, be it a representative democracy or
dictatorship, is most effective at preserving CPRs, then it is in the interest of the citizens
of that community to institute that form of government, at least in the administration of
the CPR. Then, a government that purports to promote an equal distribution of wealth and
responsible resource use would want to set up these kinds of governments in areas where
CPRs exist. However, the government would have an incentive to administrate the
resource inefficiently for its own benefit. The only way to overcome this is if the political
pressure on the government to keep its word and not steal from the people became
stronger than the economic benefits of abusing the CPR. This is most likely to happen
when the members of CPR communities are aware of their economic losses and are
inspired to campaign for change. Of course, effect size is everything -- if the benefits of
one form of government over another is small, the gains may not be enough to encourage
either the central government or the community members to change the status quo.
It is important to note that it is possible that the null results found in this
experiment will hold when the experiment is scaled up. In this case, we would conclude
that governments and bureaucrats should look for solutions to the CPR problem other
than the accountability of leaders to the members of the community. Instead, the answer
perhaps lays more with the economic structure of the resource, such as a private owner or
a rental structure. As political structures do not preclude economic ones, these questions
should be the subject of further study and experimentation.
Observations/Avenues for Further Research:
Certain questions not directly addressed in this analysis would nevertheless be
valuable additions to the full experimental design, or to further research. These would be
studies of the transition of power, and whether the groups conform to the selectorate
theory of Bueno de Mesquita, or distribute power and resources according to another
framework. Are votes truly bought? Is the dictator kept in check by his subjects? Does
the leader take full advantage of their position to accrue private wealth? All of these
would yield valuable insights into the mechanisms by which the CPR problem is solved,
or not, under different regime types.
Conclusion:
In conclusion, this pilot experiment, while not very powerful statistically, showed
how a similar experiment on a larger scale would work, and what adjustments would
need to be made in order to find more applicable results. It did suggest that the dictator
may be able to gain greater pay, but otherwise was inconclusive. It is also possible that
neither a democratically elected leader or a dictator significantly affects the outcome of a
common pool resource problem, but a larger scale experiment would be required to
confirm that conclusion.
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